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Abstract
Construction has been significantly affected by COVID‐19 yet is critical to the post‐
COVID economic recovery. Specifically, construction needs to be constantly aware
of safety and risk balanced with timely project delivery. Guidance for COVID‐19
must therefore be implemented in a way that reflects working practice and
pressures. There is, however, a potential knowledge gap regarding the practical
feasibility and impact of applying COVID‐19 measures within construction, made
more difficult by factors such as the temporary nature of projects and complex
working arrangements. This article presents a commentary on safe construction
during, and beyond, COVID‐19, covering the human factors challenges and practi-
calities of implementing COVID‐19 measures. We observe that while guidance is
strong on risk management, understanding of how best to implement this guidance
is not yet stable. Also, care must be taken that implementing guidance does not
detract from general safety, which is also challenged by increased pressures on
delivery arising from COVID‐19. There may, however, be opportunities for safer
working practice arising from new awareness of health, hygiene, and safety risk. The
role of safety leadership is overlooked in guidance yet is vital to ensure safe
application of COVID‐19 working practices. The key message is that COVID‐19 needs
to be integrated and promoted within a general risk management approach, in part
because this takes account of differing priorities regarding safety risks, rather than
overly focussing on COVID‐19, and also because the effectiveness of COVID‐19
mitigations can be amplified by integration with pre‐existing safety processes.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Construction is key to the global economy. In the United Kingdom,
construction is worth over £100bn and employs over 2.4 million
people (Rhodes, 2019). It is a sector that has seen a significant
impact to its operations and has been amongst the hardest hit in
terms of COVID‐19 (Koh, 2020; McClure et al., 2020; ONS, 2020).
The implications of COVID‐19 on construction are twofold.
On one hand, work has been halted or changed and new projects
paused while construction practices come to terms with new ways of
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working. Sites have had to adjust to social distancing, implementing
new hygiene and personal protective equipment (PPE) measures, and
accommodating a greater level of working from home for roles that
are not essential to front‐line work. The importance of health and
hygiene, as well as safety, has never been clearer. All of this has had
to occur while maintaining safety in the conventional aspects of
work, in a sector which ordinarily has multiple hazards. Delivering
safety is a significant challenge (Health and Safety Executive
[HSE], 2019; van der Molen et al., 2018), especially where multiple
organizations of different sizes work together, as is typically found in
medium to large construction projects (Peñaloza et al., 2020;
Rowlinson, 2004; Stiles et al., 2012; Woolley et al., 2020). The
temporary nature of arrangements can present a challenge for safety
leadership (Stiles et al., 2018a), which is a key mechanism for en-
gaging the workforce in safety (Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003).
On the other hand, construction is seen as a vital part of sti-
mulating the post‐COVID economy, and there is much impetus to
start work on “shovel ready” schemes (e.g., UK Gov, 2020). As an
example, transport civil engineering is a significant part of this sector,
with rail electrification and high‐speed rail seen as essential strate-
gies to support decarbonization (International Energy Agency, 2019).
In the more immediate term, short‐ and medium‐sized engineering
projects are essential to maintain the road and rail network, down to
local schemes to convert roads to cycle lanes, in a move to address
new travel patterns arising from COVID‐19 (Laverty et al., 2020).
There is therefore significant need to ensure construction can
quickly return to working safely, and in a flexible manner that might
withstand subsequent local lockdowns, future waves or even future
pandemics. In the U.K. construction sector, guidelines have been is-
sued by bodies such as Construction Leadership Council (CLC, 2020),
as well as guidance from the England and Wales Government (HM
Gov, 2020) and HSE (2020). The question is therefore one of how
well these guidelines address practice on the ground. Specifically:‐
• How well does guidance fit with the practicalities of safe working
in construction? How successfully are construction sites im-
plementing the guidance?
• How does COVID‐19, and associated guidance, affect the normal
safety behavior and safe operation of construction? Do COVID‐19
practices impede conventional safety, or offer any potentially
unanticipated benefits?
• What are the implications of organizational structure for safe
working in construction during COVID‐19?
• What are the implications for safety leadership in construction
during COVID‐19? What role can safety leadership play, and how
must it adapt to address COVID‐19?
The following paper presents a commentary on these questions,
based on reflection on the guidance against previous work in con-
struction (Stiles et al., 2012, 2018a, 2018b), and observation and
experience of the first author—a practicing health and safety con-
sultant working on delivering safety and leadership guidance and
behavioral change in construction, including during the COVID‐19
period. The contributions of the article are in describing how con-
struction is meeting the challenge of working safely within COVID‐19,
and identifying what further work is needed to continue to deliver
safety in construction during COVID‐19 and beyond. While this article
is based on experience in the U.K. construction sector, we note that
the importance of construction to the economy, and understanding
of the potential impact of COVID‐19, is shared worldwide
(e.g., Choudhari, 2020; McClure et al., 2020; OSHA, 2020).
2 | THE CONSTRUCTION CONTEXT
In normal times, delivering safety in construction is a complex ac-
tivity (Woolley et al., 2020). The nature of the work is inherently
often hazardous (Haslam et al., 2005), involving manual handling
(Antwi‐Afari et al., 2017; Hartmann & Fleischer, 2005; Paquet
et al., 1999), working around plant, working at height or with difficult
postures (Dutta et al., 2020), working with dangerous materials
(Sauni et al., 2001; Snashall, 2005) or where there are hazards such
as electricity (e.g., during rail maintenance or installation of overhead
line electrification [Salguero‐Caparrós et al., 2019]). It is a sector
where safety has reached a plateau that still accounts for a sig-
nificant number of injuries, lost working days, and a fatality injury
rate in Great Britain (1.31 per 100,000 workers) that is three times
the all industry rate (HSE, 2019) and where evidence of effective
safety interventions is scarce (van der Molen et al., 2018).
Construction‐related risks include more than the work per-
formed on site. There is movement to and from site, including travel
for people to get to work, possibly to and from communal lodgings.
At the site, there needs to be facilities for eating, for toilets and rest
areas, for storage of materials, and for storage of tools. There is a
variability in the type of tasks performed—while much civil en-
gineering work may be outside, building or refurbishment (e.g.,
plastering, electrical work) may be performed inside. Construction is
also a sector where the risks of safety must be balanced within the
context of production and the need to deliver. Perfection in safety
needs to be traded off against factors such as cost, capacity, effi-
ciency, and quality (Peñaloza et al., 2020; Wilson et al., 2009).
Construction is a sector that was amongst the first affected by
COVID‐19 (Koh, 2020) and has experienced a high rate of infection
(ONS, 2020). A number of factors may account for this. For example,
the sector has a high proportion of males, an ageing workforce with
over 40% over 40 years old, and significant numbers over 55
(ONS, 2018) and with a high number of Black, Asian and Minority
Ethnic (BAME) workers, and a high degree of migrant workforce that
have been particularly hard hit by COVID‐19 in preliminary statistics
(McClure et al., 2020). Additionally, work with hazardous materials
and exposure to potentially harmful conditions that impact the re-
spiratory function (Sauni et al., 2001) may also mean greater risk of
underlying health problems linked to COVID‐19. While data are
limited and direct causal pathways are still not well understood,
these factors may explain why this sector has experienced higher
incidence of COVID‐19.
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One specific factor that impacts safety generally, and may have a
bearing on COVID‐19, is the organization of work. Nearly all
projects, particularly medium to large projects, are delivered through
joint working of multiple organizations. A common project organi-
zation structure is developed, referred to as a “Project Delivery
Organization” (PDO) for the remainder of this article, as illustrated in
Figure 1. A PDO is established with a number of companies,
co‐ordinated via contractual obligations, for a determined period of
time (Rowlinson, 2004); key duty holders being the client, principal
contractors, and the supply chain.
Table 1 presents an example of a medium‐sized PDO and some
of the key characteristics (this is an anonymized aggregation of six
pre‐COVID‐19 projects). These projects are highly dynamic,
increasing in total numbers of people on site and numbers of
sub‐contractors as the project progresses. Work is often delayed, so
rather than being represented as a normal distribution, work and
numbers of workers can be “skewed” to finish the job on time.
Sub‐contractors may come from different organizations, often small
(five people or less), and often engaged in specialist work (e.g.,
working at height, electrical installation, etc.).
An implication of the PDO is that it can make more complex the
communication and management of safety. Typically, safety is man-
aged down the hierarchy, but feedback up the hierarchy is often
restricted (Woolley et al., 2020). There may be different levels of
safety culture (Stiles et al., 2018b) and variable application of safety
processes within pockets of the PDO (Stiles et al., 2012). Companies
employing fewer than 100 people have a tendency for higher
accident rates, indicative of poor safety performance (Fairman &
Yapp, 2005; Pinder et al., 2016; Vickers et al., 2003). Similarly,
construction industry studies by the UK Health and Safety Executive
showed that companies within this sector employing fewer than
400 people have significantly poorer safety performance than larger
organizations (HSE, 2011). Projects and priorities change during their
execution, with contractors leaving and joining, hampering clear
management and communication of safety. Where there is a lack of
F IGURE 1 Typical structure of a Project
Delivery Organization




Project value (millions) £10m
Project duration 52 weeks
Number of site management team
from PC on site
5
Number of people on site (average) 40
Number of people on site (peak) 100
Subcontracted workforce 50%
Number of accidents/incidents 8
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commitment from the supply chain it is very difficult for the principal
contractor to implement effective interventions due to the mixed
messages received by the workforce regarding priorities (Briscoe &
Dainty, 2005; Briscoe et al., 2001). It is therefore a relevant question
as to whether the influencing factors for general safety within
the PDO will also have a bearing on the implementation of
COVID‐guidance.
One significant factor in the delivery of safety in general is lea-
dership (Flin & Yule, 2004; Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Luria, 2003). Since
COVID‐19 there has needed to be a rapid and wholesale change of
construction site safety, health, and hygiene, relying on leaders to give
clear direction and resources, as well as ensuring that the controls
necessary to be COVID secure are in place across all construction sites.
Effective safety performance is influenced from senior management
where leaders should examine their own behaviors to become more
effective leaders in safety. It is recognized that leadership drives cul-
ture, which in turn influences behavior (Zohar & Luria, 2003). However,
the construction industry recognizes the lack of leadership across the
sector (CIOB, 2008). Safety leadership is needed both in terms of senior
management by driving safety and their visible commitment to safety
(Marsh et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 1998), but also by front‐line su-
pervisors, who demonstrate commitment by ensuring the workforce
are involved in safety decision making, and prioritizing safety above
production (Andriessen, 1978; Farrington‐Darby et al., 2005).
The implications of the PDO and leadership intersect with lea-
dership responsibilities often unclear between the different organi-
zations within the PDO (Arditi & Chotibhongs, 2005). While the
principal contractor has the primary responsibility for co‐ordination
of site safety, the employer also has statutory duties for their em-
ployees. Differences in safety culture and safety practice across the
PDO may inhibit how safety leadership from the principal contractor
influences the supply chain (Stiles et al., 2018a, 2018b).
2.1 | COVID‐19 and guidance
It is important to consider the mechanisms of transmission of
COVID‐19. Transmission is primarily airborne as droplets from
person to person through face to face contact (e.g., coughing)
(Fennelly, 2020; Setti et al., 2020), though recent evidence also in-
dicates that the virus may be suspended in the air as aerosols for
appreciable periods of time (Domingo et al., 2020). Carriers may be
symptomatic or asymptomatic (Kenyon, 2020) and transmission is
significantly greater in enclosed spaces. There is also a potential risk
of spread of the virus through fomites (Stephens et al., 2019) on
contact surfaces, with contamination by falling droplets or hand
contact from a carrier. The virus can remain viable for different
lengths of time, up to several days, depending on the surface material
(Suman et al., 2020). Further transmission can occur via self‐
inoculation, as the virus enters the body by the airways (nose and
mouth), or the eyes, primarily by hand contact.
As a result, the global strategy has been one of limiting person to
person contact, either through complete reduction in social contact
(lockdowns, closing of workplaces, schools, public spaces, etc.) or
through social distancing. This distance has varied by country and,
over time, within countries. In England, the guidance at the time of
writing is 2 m social distancing without mitigation, or 1 m with sui-
table mitigation (such as a face mask). Also, public health messaging
has emphasized hygiene, particularly washing hands on a regular
basis and cleaning and disinfection of contact surfaces.
This general advice has informed guidance for either work
generally, or specifically for construction. Three relevant sets of
guidance are the HM Government construction‐specific advice for
construction and outdoor working, the Health and Safety Executive
return to work advice, and the Construction Leadership Council
COVID‐19 guidance. These are summarized in Table 2, with some
examples of the content of the guidance in brackets. There have
been several revisions of these documents and the summaries refer
to the latest versions on 13/10/20.
There are multiple factors to consider when looking at this gui-
dance. First, there are significant similarities across the guidance. All
have gone through several iterations to stay abreast of changes in
science, national policy, and general awareness in society of
COVID‐19 risk and mitigation. The guidance reflects approaches to
reduce the primary modes of transmission (airborne as droplets and
aerosols and through contact surfaces) and the major mitigations
(social distancing, ventilation, hygiene/handwashing, cleaning of con-
tact surfaces). All have, at least in part, a typical hierarchy of controls
approach to managing COVID‐19 risk, including seeking to eliminate
exposure by only working on site where necessary; reducing exposure
through social distancing, cleaning, and hygiene; and then working
through isolation, control, PPE and behaviors. It is only the CLC gui-
dance, however, that explicitly structures the risks in accordance with
a hierarchy of controls. Both the HM Government and HSE advice is
structured more in terms of the functions being managed (e.g., the
work area, getting to site, moving around and in between sites).
All sets of guidance highlight that the areas of risk extend be-
yond the core activities of construction to include travel, rest facil-
ities, changing facilities, materials in and out, and so on. From an
ergonomics standpoint, all emphasize the need to consider job re‐
design to minimize exposure, including some quite specific guidance
(e.g., from the HM Government guidance, to encourage working side‐
by‐side rather than face‐to‐face). There is also an emphasis on or-
ganizational aspects (e.g., the design of shifts to minimize exposure).
However, while all mention engagement with staff, this is not cov-
ered substantially.
3 | OBSERVATION 1: MANAGING
COVID‐19 RISK IN CONSTRUCTION
The first question to address is how the practice of construction
work has adapted to working in a manner that manages the risk of
COVID‐19. Relevant to that question is the issue of how guidance
has been applied, and whether there are limitations or gaps in this
guidance.
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3.1 | Implementing the guidance
Unlike other sectors (e.g., retail, hospitality) that experienced an almost
complete shutdown for several months, many sites continued to work
in some form throughout the peak of COVID‐19 in the United Kingdom,
during March–June 2020. The guidance, particularly from CLC, HSE,
and the UK Government was released quite quickly and then rapidly
updated as either new knowledge came to light, or the severity of the
outbreak in the United Kingdom eased. Construction is a sector that is
able to respond to changes in circumstances and regularly deals with
changes in health and safety guidance and regulation. While changes
have been difficult, people and processes have been able to react
swiftly. This has been helped by guidance being well‐publicized across
the industry, and that, as a public health emergency, there has been a
constant public and media attention on COVID‐19.
One of the challenges of working under COVID‐19 for con-
struction has been the practical implementation of guidance, and
knowing what is practicable when implementing procedures such as
cleaning. An example is the cleaning of touch points around site
infrastructure, such as ladders and scaffolding. There is clearly the
potential for either very frequent or irregular usage in the course of
construction work, posing questions of whether they should be
cleaned after every use, hourly or daily? Staff and management alike
are still interpreting how best to implement the general guidance so
as to meet on‐site requirements. Interpreting the guidance extends
beyond the core activities and functions of “building” to include
supporting functions such as canteen and mess facilities, toilets, and
site security.
Overall, while there is an awareness of new standards, it is not
always clear how these should be implemented. The understanding
of what is needed to cause infection is evolving and the application of
these mitigations is unprecedented with no guidance to share ex-
amples of good practice. The fact that the Health and Safety
TABLE 2 Summary of COVID‐19 guidance—general and specific
to the construction sector




• Thinking about risk (all need to engage in a risk assessment; consult
with staff; failure to conduct COVID‐19 risk assessment, or to act
on it, is a breach of health and safety law)
• Who should go to work (consider whether needed on site; plan for
minimum people; keep in‐touch with off‐site workers)
• Social distancing (wherever possible, handwashing, different
locations, different roles)
• Customers, visitor, and contractors (managing contacts, providing/
explaining guidance)
• Cleaning the workplace (before opening, keeping the workplace
clean, hygiene, changing rooms and showers, handling equipment,
materials, waste) (cleaning procedures for shared equipment;
handwashing)
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) (should not encourage
precautionary use)
• Workforce management (shifts and breaks work travel,
communications, and training)
• Inbound and outbound goods (pick‐up and drop‐off; frequency;
driver behavior)
Health and Safety Executive (as of 09/20)
https://www.hse.gov.uk/coronavirus/assets/docs/working-safely-
guide.pdf
• Talking with your workers (guide to communicating with staff, also
consider if English is not first language)
• Who should go to work (changing tasks to reduce risk; work from
home if possible; if cannot work at home, protection, handwashing,
minimum number of people)
• Protect people at risk (plan for the vulnerable or with vulnerable
family)
• Getting into and leaving work (travel alone if possible, staggering
arrival and departure times, handwashing)
• Work area (social distancing, where you cannot distance, keeping
work area clean)
• Moving around work environment (only essential trips, restrict job
rotation, temporary walkways)
• Common areas (toilets, canteens, shower areas)
• Good hygiene (handwashing, promoting hygiene, guidance for
cleaning of hygiene areas)
• Information and guidance (share information with workers, with
visitors, hold conversations, listen and act)
• PPE (personal protective equipment) (continue normal use)




• When to travel to work (not when symptomatic; at higher risk;
living in vulnerable group)
• Travel to work (share with similar groups; good ventilation; pairing
arrangements; if must use public transport avoid the peak)
• Driving at work (travel between sites; share with same individuals;
cleaning vehicle)
• Site access and egress (one way systems; minimize congestion;
hygiene; site inductions)
• Handwashing (regular breaks; additional facilities; clean facilities)
• Toilet facilities (restrict number at one time; clean)
• Canteens and rest areas—(increase size of facilities; staggered
break times)
• Changing facilities (increase size; restrict number of people at
one time)
• Work planning to avoid close contact (with a hazard control
approach)
• Emergency service and first aid (plan; anticipate delays)
• Cleaning (toilets; handrails; lift and hoist controls)
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Executive (the U.K. safety regulator) has powers, and new funding, to
enforce COVID‐19 compliance can exacerbate anxieties over what
constitutes appropriate measures.
3.2 | Applying controls
Some functions and processes lend themselves more readily than
others to mitigation based on how readily COVID‐19 risk manage-
ment can be integrated into pre‐existing processes. For example, the
guidance highlights the need for cleaning of tools and equipment. As a
matter of standard practice on large projects, large plant (e.g., ex-
cavators) will have “(ignition) key control” processes, whereby only
competent staff are able and required to sign the equipment out for
use and to sign it back afterwards. It is therefore relatively straight-
forward to link this process to additional COVID‐19 relevant steps,
such as cleaning the seat and controls before plant is handed back. On
the other hand, smaller pieces of equipment (e.g., shovels) are usually
taken from communal stores on an ad hoc basis without specific
controls. These communal stores may not have a “stores person” to
manage the tool cleaning, and so forth, and thus new COVID‐19
controls are more difficult to apply. Making arrangements for secure
storage of such tools on site can increase contamination risk.
The example of using a stores person to manage communal tools
highlights the choice between collective versus individual controls.
While collective measures are higher up the control hierarchy, they
often require extra resources (in cost, an extra person on site,
management time, and surveillance). Individual control measures
have greater reliance on individual compliance to COVID‐19 con-
trols, as there is less reliance on organizational safety management
processes. This is widely accepted as the less preferred option for
risk mitigation and control (UK Gov, 1999).
Control measures may be linked into a compliance and assess-
ment regime, but this needs provision of new roles and competencies
to check compliance. The CLC guidance provides checklists to cover
when to conduct cleaning, but this needs processes to manage, in-
cluding consideration when checklists do not work and complacency
sets in (Rydenfält et al., 2014).
3.3 | Screening and testing
This brings on the question of what to do and what processes need
to be in place should someone be later found to have COVID‐19.
Processes for conducting prework “tests” such as temperature
checks, questions at security, and induction around symptoms are all
appearing. Given that there needs to be a log of people on site for
fire regulation, and so forth, this is another example of being able to
link into pre‐existing processes. However, the efficacy of such tests
in detecting infection in pre‐ or a‐ symptomatic individuals is limiting
(Mitra et al., 2020). Enhanced processes might involve random swab
testing across the site, but would be prohibitive in terms of planning,
cost, and availability of testing capacity. What is reasonably
practicable is a question of judgment. That said, there is already a
culture and expectation of Drugs and Alcohol testing, both at in-
duction and spot checks, particularly for working on highways or rail.
This may be particularly useful in future with widespread antibody
testing and, eventually, vaccination.
3.4 | Communication and engagement
Engagement is referenced within the literature (e.g., Conchie
et al., 2013) and guidelines and, in practice, sites are finding new
ways to accommodate engagement. There is a reliance on face to
face briefings to deliver key safety information, and these are in-
creasingly conducted outside, taking account of social distancing
restrictions. Whilst the weather has on the whole been accom-
modating over summer months, how to carry out briefings externally
as COVID‐19 continues into the winter months may need further
consideration. Before COVID‐19 formal engagement with the
frontline was often in meetings (safety committees or safety action
groups) or through on‐site leadership tours. This has changed, par-
ticularly on larger projects, due to often limited internal space to
accommodate face to face sessions whilst meeting social distancing
requirements. With fewer non‐essential site visits being undertaken
from those not permanently site based (to reduce risk of transmis-
sion and exposure) there have been fewer leadership tours under-
taken. This form of engagement generally takes place in less confined
areas with general dilution ventilation, and so does provide a means
of continued leader and workforce engagement.
Since the start of the pandemic, there has been an increased use
of technology to facilitate communication and engagement. Whether
these are replacing traditional face to face meetings now hosted via an
online system, or through increased use of social media channels set
up within projects to communicate more effectively, and remotely, for
example, whatsapp groups. Another potential use of technology is QR
Codes to track individual briefing records within a project. Up to this
year, these would have predominantly been captured via paper and
pen signature of receipt. It is still early days to determine whether
technology could be an enabler for improved safety practices, culture,
and behaviors, noting that the construction sector is not renown for
embracing technological solutions (Okpala et al., 2020) and there are
potential implications for increase in stress and work‐life balance with
implementation of new technology (Holden & Sunindijo, 2018). Also,
we note that a high number of migrant workers in the construction
sector leads to a language barrier that can impede safety messaging
(Bust et al., 2008; Oswald et al., 2019).
A final comment is that the nature of the pandemic, affecting
society as a whole, seems to be helping to push through change
management, acceptance, and adoption of change at a much faster
rate than normally experienced with construction health and safety
initiatives. While research has established the link between taking
work‐related safety back to home life (Anger et al., 2018;
Fleming, 2001), this may be an example of safety in the home (and
wider society) taking safety into the workplace.
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4 | OBSERVATION 2: BROADER
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY
The impact of COVID‐19 would also appear to have wider implica-
tions for safety in general in construction. These are both negative
and positive.
4.1 | Negative implications: COVID‐19 as a
distraction
The observation from current working, is that some sites seem to be
focussed on COVID risk at the expense of awareness and vigilance of
more general safety. This is in part because COVID‐19 has acted as a
distraction, reducing the capacity of front‐line workers and man-
agement to focus on day‐to‐day safety concerns. While there is no
data as yet, the impression is that safety standards have slipped back
and there is a lack of focus, particularly on those sites where safety
behaviors and culture were already less than ideal.
There have also been observed instances where work changes to
accommodate COVID‐19 guidance has introduced a secondary risk. For
example, as a result of site rules to reduce the numbers of people using
lifts and hoists at any one time, queues can form and workers elect to
carry equipment up staircases with greater risk of falls or dropping tools.
4.2 | Negative implications: Reduced resources
The need to reduce people on site has typically been applied to man-
agerial roles. This includes safety management roles, where those who
may have regularly been on‐site now rarely visit the site. The result is
that there is a reduction in focus on general safety on site, resulting in
reduced compliance. Additionally, an implication of COVID‐19 is that
there have been fewer competent people on site, either through illness
or due to efforts to limit the numbers of people for reasons of social
distancing. The implication is that, with fewer competent people, staff
have to resort to workarounds and less safe practices. For example, with
fewer people on site with competencies for using plant to move mate-
rials and tools, workers may resort to manual lifting and carrying, and
pressure remaining to work more quickly for those operating the plant.
4.3 | Negative implications: General wellbeing
There is an unknown impact on general wellbeing of the
workforce. Frontline staff, many who have worked through the
peak of the lockdown, are working under time pressure, with
reduced resources, in a high‐risk environment, with the added
pressures of COVID‐19 working practice. This is achieved while
dealing with household challenges that COVID‐19 has brought
with it—ensuring elderly relatives are well, keeping on top of
shopping, home schooling of children, and so forth. This combi-
nation of factors may well have a bearing on long‐term mental
health in a sector where this is already an issue (Choudhari, 2020;
Love et al., 2010).
4.4 | Positive implications: Pushing the health and
safety agenda
Despite the challenges of COVID‐19, there have been benefits for safety.
The need to adapt to COVID‐19 has generated a readiness to change.
The sector has been able to respond rapidly to health and safety‐related
change, and has thus demonstrated to both management and front‐line
staff what is achievable when priority is given to health and safety. This
experience may well benefit safety promotion in the future.
Furthermore, while there is often an emphasis on the safety
aspect of “health and safety,” and health and hygiene are often
overlooked (Jones et al., 2019). COVID‐19 has presented an op-
portunity to emphasize the importance of more general hygiene
practices as a major consideration for construction. This may give
impetus to considering health and health‐related behavior change
(see Mullan et al., 2015) beyond the COVID‐19 outbreak.
4.5 | Positive implications: Work redesign
The need to re‐design work and processes in light of COVID‐19
guidance has also presented an opportunity for a more general work
re‐design to improve safety. In particular, thinking of the hierarchy of
controls, COVID‐19 has provided an impetus to think more about
the circumstances where people can be kept at distance from dan-
gerous equipment or activities. Safer behaviors may be developed by
new prescribed practices by safety managers or supervisors, but
COVID‐19 has also generated some ad hoc behaviors that are de-
veloped by the workforce. In a recent observation as an example,
placing steelwork columns (e.g., for steel frames or for rail overhead
line masts) onto bolts is usually a task where people can expose
themselves to finger and hand entrapment by moving too close when
positioning the steel. Instead, workers have taken to using metal rods
to push the steels into place to maintain social distancing, but also
reducing the overall safety risk of entrapment. There is the oppor-
tunity to observe and learn from these ad hoc workarounds and
implement them in more routine practice.
5 | OBSERVATION 3: ORGANIZATIONAL
FACTORS
5.1 | Organizational pressures
Many projects are still working to the same timelines and delivery
dates expected of their clients, despite a drop in productivity during
the peak of lockdown, and an ongoing reduction of site staff. This
creates extra pressure to deliver, which again may be at the expense
of general, and COVID‐19 specific, safety. Additionally, the final stages
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of a project are often where specific trades come in for “fit‐out” (e.g.,
electrical work, plastering). While normally trades work around each
other in what can be rather confined spaces, social distancing makes
these arrangements much more complex. Where construction in-
volves buildings, these final project stages are more likely to occur
indoors, with a higher risk of COVID‐19 transmission. The difficulty of
these arrangements is exacerbated by these trades often being self‐
employed or working for small companies within the supply chain. It is
not simply that people within the same organization are having to
coordinate, but that people from different organizations need to
consult and coordinate in a way that has not previously been required.
This requires extra time and resources, and in practice people may try
to work round each other in an unplanned, and often risky, manner.
One implication is that some sites are moving to 24‐h working to meet
deadlines, creating both fatigue risks (Hallowell, 2010; Maynard
et al., 2020) and issues around handover.
5.2 | Impact of the PDO
While the guidance shows the path to implementing COVID‐19 miti-
gation, there is a question in a complex, fluid arrangement like the
PDO of who is responsible. Typically, safety on site is the responsi-
bility of the Principal Contractor. However, each organization has a
role to play in ensuring health and safety. Having clear responsibilities
is important to eliminate confusion (Arditi & Chotibhongs, 2005). For
example, if a small and specialist company undertakes scaffolding
erection for a principal contractor, they will be responsible for the
providing clean (sanitized) equipment, and workers using cleaned tools
and vehicles. The question of who is responsible for maintaining the
appropriate level of hygiene for the completed scaffolding needs
clarification, which before COVID‐19, any maintenance responsibility
would have been with the Principal Contractor. With many con-
tractors on site, often at the same time, lines of responsibility for the
additional COVID‐19 controls can become blurred.
The size of the project would also appear to be a factor in
COVID‐19 management. Larger sites, with major clients and princi-
pal contractors, may have a greater level of awareness and rigor in
comparison to smaller sites. Project size may have both a cultural
and pragmatic contribution to how safety is managed post‐COVID‐19.
Larger sites are more likely to have processes for the use of large
plant where key control processes can be adapted to include cleaning
(see Section 3.2). Processes may have lower levels of compliance on a
smaller project, which may only have one or two pieces of plant and
these are always operated by the same competent workers. However,
there is likely to be a reduced risk of transmission on smaller projects
with fewer workers, than on larger projects.
5.3 | Transient workforce
PDOs often include small organizations, or self‐employed workers,
sometimes working to short or zero hours contracts. This can put a
pressure on the small company or individual to be on site, to be paid,
despite the personal risks and anxiety that might occur within the
current pandemic. Contractors commonly work across multiple sites
(e.g., plant operators and other specialists may be rapidly moving
from one site to the next). This presents a risk of cross‐
contamination of COVID‐19 across sites, as well as challenges for the
individual or supplier to understand differences in working ar-
rangements on sites working under different implementations and
interpretations of the guidelines.
There may be limited commitment to safety if an individual or
supply chain company is only on a project for a short period of time.
Finally, as the national strategy of containment moves to one of local
lockdowns, as has been the case, there is a risk that people who travel
into the site from elsewhere will not be able to get to work. Again, this
presents pressures for the individual and challenges for the PDO in
co‐ordination and delivery of work, resource planning, which then feed
through into pressures that conflict with general safety.
6 | OBSERVATION 4: THE ROLE OF
SAFETY LEADERSHIP
6.1 | Mechanisms of leadership
As noted previously (see Section 3.4), one of the key elements of
leadership is a presence on site and leaders being able to exhibit and
reinforce safety behaviors (Stiles et al., 2018a). However, the re-
striction of people on site means that this is challenging during
COVID‐19. It is too early to understand whether it shows commit-
ment to safety by leaders staying away (i.e., following the same rules
as everyone else), or weakens leadership and promotes a perception
that they are not involved or fearful of coming to site.
More generally, it is not yet clear which leadership mechanisms
(Stiles et al., 2018a) are still relevant when people are remote from
the site. Safety leadership tours are a well‐established practice
within the construction sector, focused on leader and frontline
workforce engagement, however many of these have stopped taking
place with leaders undertaking COVID Compliance audits rather
than focusing on engagement with workers. Leaders (senior man-
agers, senior project managers, senior safety staff) are instead having
to look at other means to communicate with staff and raise the
profile of safety—both in terms of COVID‐19 specific measures, and
safety generally. Video conferencing has been adopted widely, but it
is unclear yet how best to use this mechanism for maximum positive
impact on frontline safety engagement, particularly given that con-
struction is not a sector that is usually quick to adopt new working
practices and technology (Okpala et al., 2020).
6.2 | Leadership knowledge and skills
Effective leadership is more than a delivery issue. It is a question of
making sure that leaders have the right skills and competencies to
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actively lead, particularly through the period of turbulence since
COVID‐19. How best to implement guidance is still emerging, as is an
understanding of what constitutes good onsite management, com-
pliance monitoring, and enforcement in this type of crisis situation
(Dirani et al., 2020). Until this is fully understood, it is not always
clear to leaders what are the appropriate messages to communicate.
Is it important to wholly focus on COVID‐19 controls as this is the
new risk facing the population, and when is it appropriate to cascade
routine health and safety messages, and by what medium? Finally, it
is not yet clear what construction workers are expecting from their
leaders to support them through COVID‐19. It would be valuable to
systematically capture what they need from their leaders, and how
they want them to communicate, given current working and chal-
lenges. Once there is a better understanding of these factors, it may
be necessary to upskill and develop leaders within the sector to
effectively lead safety within PDOs.
6.3 | Intersection with the PDO
Again, we need to consider that a construction project is not a sin-
gular organization, but a temporary conglomeration of organizations
of different sizes. In this context, there is a question of who should be
the visible leaders that will have the most influence on the workers
on the ground. Should it be from the client, the principal contractor,
or from contractors? While this is always a relevant question (Stiles
et al., 2018a), it is transformed by COVID‐19 because it is more
difficult for leaders to be visible and be active. If, for example, only
the leaders from the principal contractor are able to be visible on
site, what should they be prioritizing? Also, what messages and how
should the leaders within contractor organizations working on pro-
jects communicate to their employees, who are under the day to day
management of a principal contractor? The situation raises the
question about co‐ordination of communication, consistency of
messages, how these are reinforced as well as opportunities for
worker feedback. Safety leaders from both the principal contractor
and contractor (as employer) must continue to reinforce their mes-
sages in a manner that is meaningful to everyone under their man-
agement and supervision.
7 | DISCUSSION
This article has reviewed the current state of working under COVID‐19
for the construction sector. Observations are summarized in Table 3,
including recommendations and arising from this review and sugges-
tions for future research. Looking across the observations, some key
messages stand out. First, COVID‐19 is a risk like many others (Wilson
et al., 2009), albeit one that has affected the industry on an un-
precedented scale. It is likely that the most effective way of managing
that risk is where it can be integrated into existing mechanisms of
control. This both makes implementation easier and simplifies
the workforce communication of the risk mitigation for COVID‐19.
The observations are applicable to all organizations within the PDO, not
just the principal contractor.
The second message is that we do not yet fully have to the tools
to manage that risk. The guidance provides a strong framework, but
there are still uncertainties about the implementation of the gui-
dance both at an individual and organizational level. These tools in-
clude the need for evaluation studies to determine what are the
effective ways of measuring and understanding whether methods are
successful in managing COVID‐19 (Pawson et al., 2005; Pedersen
et al., 2012). What is “reasonably practicable” is still emerging, and
this is made more complex by COVID‐19 being a dynamic phenom-
enon (Rasmussen, 1997) both in terms of the science of transmission
(Setti et al., 2020), the risk it represents (e.g., in terms of a “second
wave”) and changing societal attitudes and perceptions. Organiza-
tions will have to learn to continue to operate with this degree of
uncertainty for some time to come (Grote, 2004).
Third, the role and influence of the PDO goes beyond the
practicalities of needing to brief people arriving on site. It has a
whole range of implications both in terms of mitigation (e.g., how
contractors will clean, use and store the tools they bring to site) but
also communication and collaboration (e.g., how they understand the
different arrangements in the different workplaces they attend; how
multiple trades work together to coordinate safe working). This is a
responsibility that is shared by the Principal Contractor and all of the
supply chain. We note that individual measures are unlikely to have
an effect on their own and it is likely a range of measures will need to
be taken together if there is to be significant impact on safety (van
der Molen et al., 2018).
The final message is that there are benefits and opportunities that
will arise from dealing with COVID‐19 risks. Organizations have found
that they can adapt rapidly, improve hygiene, redesign tasks, and adopt
new technology. All of these are valuable lessons for safety professionals
to draw upon for the ongoing challenge of COVID‐19 and for safety
generally. However, there is a note of caution here. National govern-
ments are anticipating a construction‐led economic recovery from
COVID‐19. This may be an appropriate vision, but not without some risk
to safety, especially where many changes in work organization and
practices are implemented with some urgency. We believe that findings
from this article will give some direction to researchers, industry, and
policy makers for steps that are needed to understand more about the
correct balance between safety and construction performance.
There are a number of pieces of practical guidance that can be
offered at this stage. The first, and following on from the above, is to
try to implement COVID‐19 management within pre‐existing risk
management where appropriate. This will likely lead to lower over-
heads and greater familiarity with the processes required. Organi-
zations should look to develop their skills at virtual and video
conferencing. For example, the medical sector has published gui-
dance on how best to conduct conference calls (Oeppen et al., 2020)
and this could be used, maybe with adaptation, for application in
construction. Learning these skills will be vital given that the change
to work and remote working is likely to continue after the end of
COVID‐19.
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Finally, as with all behavior change, it is important to engage the
workforce as much as possible in the development of COVID‐19
policy and processes (de Jong & Vink, 2002; Wilson, 1995). This
includes the participatory design of work (see Section 3.2) and
consultation with construction workers and supervisors, to under-
stand the practical experience and knowledge of what works and
what does not, and to appreciate what skills, qualities, and means of
engagement that they expect of their safety leaders (see Section 5.2).
TABLE 3 Summary of observations, recommendations, and future research work
Observations Sub‐themes Recommendations Future research
1. Managing COVID‐19
risk in construction
• Implementing the guidance
• Applying controls
• Screening and testing
• Communication and
engagement
• Embed COVID‐19 controls
within pre‐existing safety
controls wherever possible
• Participatory input on task
redesign
• New roles and competencies for
COVID‐19 compliance
• Apply best practice from other
sectors on use of communication
technology
• Defining effective measures of
success for COVID‐19 control
effectiveness
• Formal assessment of success of new
communication technologies
• Development of communication best
practice
• Understanding epidemiological risk in





(COVID‐19 as a distraction;
general wellbeing)
• Positive implications (pushing
the health and safety agenda;
work redesign)
• Monitor and maintain levels of
competence on‐site
• Exploit readiness to change
• Data collection (e.g., accidents vs.
infection) on the trade‐offs in
COVID‐19 safety and overall site safety
• Exploration of effective co‐messaging









• Developing and validating risk
trade‐off frameworks (e.g., Wilson
et al., 2009)
• Establish guidance for safety
collaboration across PDO
4. Role of safety
leadership
• Mechanisms of leadership
• Leadership knowledge and skills
• Intersection with the PDO
• Leadership skill/competency
development
• Maintain leadership visibility and
commitment to safety
• Determining effective safety
leadership practices when leaders
working remote from site
• Survey of front‐line staff to
understand changing leadership
needs
• Development of leadership
competence to meet future needs
F IGURE 2 Recommendations for Project Delivery Organisations (PDOs)
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In the case of transient and contract workers, this is the knowledge
that needs to be acquired across multiple sites and working condi-
tions. These recommendations, and others, are mapped onto the
PDO diagram (see Figure 2) and presented in Table 3.
Supporting COVID‐19 working in construction also requires
answers to a number of research questions. The first of these is to
understand what truly is the epidemiological impact of COVID‐19 on
construction. While initially this was seen as a sector of risk, it is
unclear whether the early indications of infections were due to a
faster return to work in comparison to other sectors or some specific
factor of construction work, or its demographic. Also, and possibly
more relevant to those in human factors and ergonomics, is whether
there was an overall decline or improvement in site safety, and in
which categories of incidents or accidents changes occurred. This
could be modeled using resilience frameworks (Peñaloza et al., 2020;
Wilson et al., 2009) to understand the new parameters and trade‐
offs involved. The role of the project safety hierarchy (Woolley
et al., 2020) and, specifically, leaders in the management of
COVID‐19 alongside other health and safety risks is worthy of fur-
ther exploration. It is not yet known whether the tried and tested
activities for demonstrating visible leadership and commitment to
safety (Stiles et al., 2018a) are still relevant and impactful in this type
of situation. Once there is greater clarity over whether COVID‐19
has changed what constitutes good safety leadership within a PDO,
there will be a need to reassess the existing skills of leaders, bridging
any skills gaps where necessary. There is a need to understand the
future role of technology as an enabler, and potential necessity, for
the facilitation of robust, open, and timely communication and en-
gagement contributing to the management of risks and associated
onsite safety performance.
Acknowledging the limitations of this article (U.K.‐based con-
struction, medium scale projects, informal observation rather than
empirical data and analysis), work should look at the multitude of
different construction projects. This needs to cover the very small
(e.g., domestic construction) through to the very large (projects like
High Speed 2), and those with a high priority and value (e.g., rail
electrification [DfT, 2020]). It should also cover specialist types of
work, such as working in tunnels, underground, or other enclosed
spaces, that might put particular pressures on adhering to guidance.
This study should take a global perspective, recognizing the huge
variation in factors that influence construction across the world, such
as understanding the ramifications of migrant construction workers
in places such as India and the Middle East (Buckley, 2012;
Choudhari, 2020; Oswald et al., 2019).
Finally, relevant lessons could be shared from the construction
industry with other transient sectors such as logistics and distribu-
tion, health services, that have similar reliance on multiagency col-
laboration and a disparate workforce (Winkler & Irwin, 2003); each
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